Hup Leong Fishery Trading
4 stars based on
The Barents Sea is a biologically productive ocean but also quite vulnerable. Seawater temperatures are low, which slows down evaporation processes and may serve to reduce the bacteriological degeneration of pollutants. There are considerable fluctuations in light intensity and variation in the water inflow from the Atlantic imply continual shifts in temperatures and ice extension.
Ecosystems are quite simple in that there are few organisms on each link of the chain, so the disruption of one may have serious implications for the rest of the system. The major commercial groundfisheries target cod, haddock and saithe, while the pelagic fisheries take Norwegian spring-spawning herring, capelin and blue whiting. Harvests are predominantly by the coastal states, Norway and Russia. Among the challenges to effective fisheries management in this region in recent years are 1 the unsettled maritime boundary line between these states and 2 their joint inability, untilto reach agreement with all distant-water fishing states on conservation and allocation measures pertaining to the Loopholea pocket of high seas located between their exclusive economic zones.
The most heated part of this management dispute hup leong fishery trading options in time with the global-level negotiations of hup leong fishery trading options United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement. This paper reviews hup leong fishery trading options role hup leong fishery trading options the bilateral fisheries regime in addressing those jurisdictional challenges, as well as its performance with regard to the tasks that any fisheries management regime must face: Due to the extension of coastal zones from the mids, a new and largely bilateral fisheries regime evolved as the most appropriate means for management of Barents Sea fish stocks.
The new regime replaced a wider regional regime that had its basis in the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention. Three agreements between Norway and the Soviet Union form the basis of the Barents Sea fisheries hup leong fishery trading options. A Framework Agreement provides for the Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission as the institutional hub of the regime.
The Commission meets annually to make consensual recommendations on total quotas of the three main shared stocks - cod, haddock and capelin, each of which are seen as a single biological unit.
Based on fixed initial allocation keys, it allocates quotas hup leong fishery trading options the parties, decides on the shares to be allocated to third parties, and determines operational restrictions. It also coordinates scientific research among institutions in the two countries.
For its part, the Grey Zone Agreement sets up a system of enforcement applicable, inter aliato a disputed part of the Barents Sea see map. Russia and Norway have agreed that the enforcement of conservation and management measures in the Grey Zone is to be exercised by the state that has issued the licence to operate there - and both coastal states may issue licenses within agreed quotas. In addition to these agreements between Russia and Norway, a set of other agreements between these two coastal states and non-coastal user states forms part of the basis for the Barents Hup leong fishery trading options fisheries regime.
In essence, the latter agreements imply that certain non-coastal states obtain access to the Barents Sea fisheries within the overall regulatory framework set up by the coastal states. While the Barents Sea fisheries complex is simpler than in many other ocean areas, since the harvest is largely taken by two coastal states, a complicating feature is the fact that the area is extremely sensitive in a military sense.
This is due to the importance of nuclear submarines deployed in Northern waters for the maintenance of the strategic deterrence, especially during the Cold War period. One consequence of this sensitivity has been helpful to fisheries management, namely that both Norway and the Soviet Union were eager to avoid unnecessary political tension in the area. Norway and Russia have still not settled their disagreement over hup leong fishery trading options the marine delimitation should follow a line of equidistance or the sector line, the latter argued by the Russian side.
At stake is a disputed area of some square kilometres hup leong fishery trading options fishing grounds are rich and the prospects for finding petroleum quite good. Because of the link in international law between the accepted exercise of management authority and the strengthening of jurisdictional claims, this dispute has been hampering resource management in the Barents Sea.
Notably, the regime has been structured in order to avoid situations where Norwegian fishermen are subject to Russian inspections in waters claimed by Norway, and vice versa, as such inspections would be seen as jeopardizing the respective claims of these countries to sovereignty over the disputed area. The key regime component here is the Grey Zone Agreement with its parallel systems of licensing and enforcement in the agreement area, which includes the disputed segment.
Before the establishment of that zone, Norway and the Soviet Union were faced with basically three alternative policy options, none of which hup leong fishery trading options have been very helpful with respect to the jurisdictional problem. In an increasingly regulated fishery, however, such a blind spot would have been quite intolerable, especially as the fish have been very profuse in the disputed area. Moreover, the parties would have had to abstain from the regulation and enforcement of third countries as well, quite detrimental to the thrust of the emerging Law of the Sea Convention.
In consequence, coastal state fishermen would have suffered and the health of the fish stocks would have been in jeopardy. There is little doubt that this would have seriously undermined the territorial claims of the restrained party; indeed, the fear that without an agreement the Soviets might try to enforce regulations in the disputed area on their own was very much a concern among key Norwegian decision-makers.
As the Svalbard experience showed, however, Norwegian inspections of Soviet vessels in an area where Norwegian jurisdiction is not clarified was likely to meet opposition from the Soviet government  ; and this opposition should logically be even stronger when the Soviets had a claim of their own to the area.
The same argument, although softened by the asymmetry in general power relationship, would be valid for Soviet inspections of Norwegian vessels. In both cases, there would be hup leong fishery trading options considerable risk of embarrassing incidents leading to diplomatic activity and possibly conflict escalation.
With the Grey Zone Agreement in place, agreed-upon management measures could be implemented and enforced without such risks; and also without one party having to accept enforcement activity from the other in waters claimed to be her own. Nevertheless, it was a deeply split Norwegian parliament which by only a slight majority passed the Grey Zone Agreement after an unusually bitter debate. The opposition argued that the Agreement was geographically biased by covering an area to the west of the disputed area which was far bigger than that to the east; and also that it might give the Soviets expectations about joint management solutions in the Barents Sea hup leong fishery trading options both fish and shelf resources.
If the critics of the Grey Zone Agreement were right when arguing that its geographical location strengthens the Soviet position, the regime would have failed to solve the problem of avoiding negative jurisdictional effects of fisheries management in the area.
However, the fact that this temporary agreement has been renewed each year for nearly two decades without any debate suggests that these effects, if there, are no longer seen as too significant. It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that the regime has successfully decoupled necessary regulation and compliance control activities from the contested territorial issue.
Because of changes in temperature and salinity, the availability of cod in the Barents Sea Loophole, which spans some 62 square kilometres, increased markedly around Cod thus became a straddling as well as a shared stock, and despite the short season due to ice conditions, this new fishing opportunity soon attracted the attention of distant water vessel operators.
In the fishery began cautiously, with vessels from the European Community, Greenland and the Faroes; but two years later it accelerated when Iceland turned its attention vigorously to this fishery.
Byas many as eighty Icelandic trawlers had operated in the Loophole. In that peak year ofhigh seas catches comprised around seven percent of the total cod harvest in the Barents Sea ecosystem. For several years afterward the fishing effort remained high, but catches declined as the migration pattern of the cod again shifted southwards.
Faced by newcomers in the Barents Sea, Norway and Russia argued fervently that both zonal attachment and historical fishing suggested that the cod stock was binational. Noting also that the stock was fully utilized, the coastal states rejected the legitimacy of the unregulated activity in the Loophole. Many of the foreign fishing vessels that operated in the area were flying flags-of-convenience, and this rendered the traditional, diplomatic channel less effective as a means of dealing with such a problem.
The Barents Sea fisheries regime did not serve as an effective tool for the coastal states in their efforts to cope with the Loophole challenge. The gradual phasing-out of non-coastal state fishing from the region in the s had been validated by the acceptance of EEZs in international customary law, but no such support from broader normative developments was forthcoming in the early s.
On the contrary, the Icelandic appearance in the Loophole coincided hup leong fishery trading options the first session of the UN Fish Stocks Conference, which implied that the rules governing the interaction between coastal states and distant water fishing nations hup leong fishery trading options the high seas were in a state of flux. The measures available to Norway and Russia were therefore largely diplomatic and economic. Unlike the Sea of Okhotsk case, no naval exercises have occurred in the most relevant fishing area that could be perceived as partly motivated by fisheries concerns.
Coordinated allocation of parts of the total quota to third parties was provided for in the annual bilateral protocols drawn up by the coastal states. After bilateral negotiations with Norway inGreenland and the European Community decided to limit activities in the Loophole and keep total harvests in the Barents Sea within the overall quotas allotted under reciprocal access agreements. The Faroes agreed in to prohibit landings of fish that had been taken without quotas in international waters.
The coastal state diplomatic strategy versus Iceland, the remaining challenger, proved much less effective. When the Icelanders first appeared in the area, Norway and Russia argued that Iceland had no historic record of harvesting in the region and refused to negotiate Icelandic demands for a Barents Sea cod quota. As a result, although their vessels fished on the same stock, coastal and non-coastal user states remained unable to achieve compatible measures through coordination of their management policies.
Formal negotiations began inpartly because the Icelanders, refusing to yield to political pressure, had rapidly acquired some 75 percent of the unregulated harvests in the Loophole, and partly because the coastal states were reluctant to stretch international law regarding unilateral enforcement hup leong fishery trading options beyond miles, an issue that at the time was under negotiation in the UN.
The coastal states sought to establish an arrangement that would hup leong fishery trading options Iceland a share of a separate Loophole quota; the size of the total Loophole quota would correspond with the zonal attachment of the cod stock to the high seas area, estimated at two percent.
In Norway, domestic legislation was introduced in prohibiting the landing of high seas catches taken without a quota; in practice, even port hup leong fishery trading options were rejected. Another significant coastal state measure to deter unregulated high seas activities was the practice of blacklisting Loophole vessels from subsequent access to the Norwegian EEZ, even if the vessel had changed ownership in the meantime. The Russian Fisheries Committee exerted similar pressure to bear even in Icelandic ports by encouraging the Murmansk-based industry to discontinue landings of cod from Russian vessels at ports in Iceland.
Because of the cod crisis in Icelandic waters, supply contracts with Russian companies were important to the processing industry of that country during the s.
The public and private sanctions did not deter unregulated harvesting activities, mainly for two reasons: The fleets operating in the Loophole were able to operate independently of the Russian and Norwegian fishing industries, and the Icelanders were determined to establish a sizable fishery in the Loophole. In the long run, however, reliance on Icelandic ports, some four day-trips away, would add considerably to the over-all costs of hup leong fishery trading options in the Barents Sea.
This is especially true for new, efficient trawlers, the profitability of which tends to be highly hup leong fishery trading options to reductions in the number of annual fishing-days.
Ina regional accord was finally reached. The terms of the Agreement are similar to those previously drawn up bilaterally between Norway and Greenland and the Faroes. In exchange for hup leong fishery trading options quotas in the EEZs of the Barents Sea, Iceland must refrain from harvesting cod or seeking new fishing rights for the cod stock beyond the coastal zones; Iceland must also open its national waters to vessels from the other two countries.
Other provisions oblige the parties to discourage their nationals from operating vessels under flags of convenience in the Hup leong fishery trading options Sea, to prohibit landing of catches that are taken without a quota, and, subject to other obligations under international law, to deny port access to vessels that engage in these activities.
The steep decline of the Loophole fisheries in the years preceding the signing of the Agreement had served to reduce the distance between coastal hup leong fishery trading options quota offers and Icelandic demands, and the Agreement provides for a stable Icelandic share of a little less hup leong fishery trading options two percent of the TAC.
Because there was a partial overlap in time between the Loophole dispute and the negotiation of the U. Fish Stocks Agreement, it is of interest to examine how the regional-level process influenced the global negotiations.
There are generally at least two ways in which regional management disputes can influence the course and outcome of global negotiations. First, by a process that may be termed diffusive interplay, the substantive or operational solutions to difficult problems that regional negotiations may reach can be adapted for use at the global level. Second, through political interplay, regional disputes may influence the relative bargaining power of competing blocs or encourage or facilitate various types of leadership activities at global negotiations.
In the years it took to negotiate the U. Fish Stocks Agreement, regional efforts to manage the Loophole fishery moved from disappointment to disillusionment. Several rounds of negotiations, bilateral and trilateral, were held without the emergence of any substantial resolution. The quota trade-off solution was ineffectiveness with respect to Iceland and not consistent with the emphasis in the Fish Stocks Agreement of a multilateral approach to regional management.
Diffusiontherefore, formed a negligible part of the interplay between the evolving Loophole regime and the U. With regard to bargaining powerthe three main antagonists in the Loophole dispute all belonged to the coastal state bloc during the negotiation of the Fish Stocks Agreement; but each state also had a tradition of distant water fishing operations. Throughout the negotiations, the core group remained a salient forum for joint action, including the drafting of proposals on controversial issues.
Influenced partly by the Loophole situation, but also by the expected resumption of high seas fisheries hup leong fishery trading options Norwegian spring-spawning herring by non-coastal states in the North-East Atlantic, Norway placed itself firmly on the coastal state side of the straddling stocks issue. Russia, for hup leong fishery trading options part, has traditionally loomed large in the global distant water fishing league. Whereas an estimated half of the Russian catch was taken in waters beyond its jurisdiction inthe hup leong fishery trading options had fallen to 22 percent in The Russian posture preceded the escalation of the Loophole issue in and was largely shaped by the already well-established high seas dispute in the Far East, a region where today no more than two percent of the harvest is taken outside the EEZ.
Whereas several forms of leadership were exercised by the parties to the Loophole dispute during the Fish Stocks Conference, on close inspection none of these leadership roles appears to have been triggered by the Barents Sea situation. Structural leadership implies the ability to bring material capabilities to bear on the negotiation of particular issues. The emergence of the Loophole controversy, however, blended the traditional interests with a concern for the rights of newcomers on the high seas and a corresponding reluctance to extend coastal state enforcement rights in such waters.
The Barents Sea situation was not conducive to motivating Norway and Russia to take coercive measures and thus provide the type of structural leadership that had been provided by Iceland in the s and by Canada in the high seas detention of the Spanish trawler Estai. Such measures, were they to contribute to the making of international law, would require consent or acquiescence on the hup leong fishery trading options of those subject to them as well as third parties.
Dealing with a much more threatened fish stock, a leading scholar, W.